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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIBILITY OF INTEREST ON DE-
BENTURES ISSUED AS A DIVIDEND-Taxpayer, a wholly-owned subsidiary cor-
poration, had filed consolidated returns with its parent prior to 1934. When 
Congress abolished consolidated returns in that year, the subsidiary issued 
6% debentures as a dividend to the parent company and subsequently 
deducted the interest paid on these bonds. The Commissioner claimed the 
interest payments were really dividends and were not deductible. The Tax 
Court upheld the Commissioner pointing out the tax-saving motive, ab-
sence of new investment, and parent-subsidiary relationship as factors in-
dicating that no genuine debtor-creditor relationship existed.1 On appeal, 
held, reversed. The debentures involved were conventional in form and 
created a valid indebtedness. Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 
1956) 232 F. (2d) ll8. 
Tax preferences accorded to debt securities, but not ownership securi-
ties, have resulted in attempts to better the corporate tax position through 
utilization of debt capitalization in place of ownership capital. The In-
ternal Revenue Code permits the deduction of interest payments on in-
debtedness2 but does not allow deduction of dividend payments on stock.8 
For this reason the courts scrutinize the underlying security upon which the 
payment is based to determine whether such instrument constitutes genuine 
indebtedness or merely equity capital. Despite frequent litigation in this 
area, no comprehensive rule has been established to aid in this distinction.4 
In the case of hybrid securities, i.e., corporate investments having char-
I Kraft Foods Co., 21 T.C. 513 (1954). 
2 I.R.C., §163. 
3 But see I.R.C., §247, as to deductibility of dividends on public utility preferred 
stock. 
4 The Supreme Court has said: "There is no one characteristic, not even exclusion 
from management, which can be said to be decisive in the determination of whether obli-
gations are risk investments in the corporations or debts." John Kelley Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 326 U.S. 521 at 530 (1946). See 44 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1946). 
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acteristics both of conventional debt and equity issues, the courts weigh 
such factors as nomenclature, certainty of payment, maturity date, source 
of payment, treatment on corporate books, voting rights, and subordination 
to rights of other creditors, in order to characterize the transaction.5 How-
ever, even when there is no ambiguity as to the nature of the instrument, 
courts sometimes treat interest on conventional indebtedness as a non-
deductible dividend. 6 The presence of a tax avoidance motive, accom-
panied by the absence of a business purpose, 7 are circumstances that may 
negate the intention to create a valid indebtedness.8 This emphasis placed 
upon the tax avoidance motive has caused increasing confusion and con-
tradiction in several recent decisions .. In earlier cases the Tax Court looked 
primarily at the reality of the indebtedness. 9 More recently the emphasis 
has been placed on the taxpayer's purpose.10 In the principal case the 
Second Circuit stressed that inquiry into a taxpayer's purpose was unneces-
sary so long as the acts were real and the taxable entities were not shams.11 
In apparent conflict with this case is another recent decision, Gooding 
Amusement ·co.,12 where deduction of interest on promissory notes issued 
to family partners for full property value was disallowed. The Tax Court 
found that the formal criteria of indebtedness were "unquestionably sat-
isfied" but concluded that the tax avoidance motivation negated the exist-
ence of bona fide indebtedness. The result reached in the Gooding case 
could be partially attributed to a failure to distinguish between hybrid 
and conventional debt securities.13 The principal case, in recognizing this 
r; See 2 P-H 1956 Tax Serv. ,rl3,096 for a useful table of cases analyzing in chronologi-
cal order the various tests used by the courts. 
6 Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954), affd. (6th Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 159. 
But cf. Toledo Blade Co., II T.C. 1079 (1948), affd. (6th Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 357, c;ert. 
den. 340 U.S. Sll (1950). 
7 In disallowing the deduction of interest on conventional indebtedness, the courts 
sometimes rely upon the "business purpose" doctrine, originated in Gregory v. Helvering, 
293 U.S. 465 (1935). In that case a transaction formally complying with statutory require-
ments was held to be unavailing to reduce taxes unless taken with a business purpose. 
Although the Gregory decision concerned reorganization, the doctrine has been applied to 
other areas of tax law including the determination of whether securities constitute stock 
or debt. See, e.g., Gooding Amusement Co., note 6 supra. See generally Rice, "Judicial 
Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance," 51 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1953). 
SEstate of Herbert B. Miller,.24 T.C. 923 (1955). 
9 See, e.g., Annis Furs, Inc., P-H T.C. Mero. Dec. ,r43,050 (1943). 
10 Gregg Co. of Delaware, 23 T.C. 170 (1954); Estate of Herbert B. Miller, note 8 
supra. But cf. John W. Walter, Inc., 23 T.C. 550 (1954); Lansing Community Hotel Corp., 
14 T.C. 183 (1950). 
11 Principal case at 128. 
12 Note 6 supra. 
13 In the Gooding case the court pointed out the absence of new capital. The Kraft 
case dealt with the requirement of new funds to support the obligation by distinguishing 
decisions involving hybrid and conventional debt issues. When an ambiguous instrument 
is being characterized, the courts may consider the absence of new investment in not 
permitting the security to be considered debt. See, e.g., Wetterau Grocery Co. v. Com-
missioner, (8th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 158; 1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. II58 (1945), affd. 
(2d Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 885. When an unambiguous security is created, it is held that 
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distinction, preserves useful approaches developed by the courts. Tax 
avoidance motives should invite careful scrutiny of the transaction, espe-
cially when the taxpayer desires to gain tax advantages through instru-
ments which purport to represent indebtedness while retaining some pro-
prietary characteristics. However, when taxpayers establish an unambiguous 
debt, a purpose of minimization or avoidance of taxes should not upset 
this legal transaction.14 The contradictory language in the Kraft and Good-
ing cases emphasizes the need for the courts to continue distinguishing 
conventional d~bts, hybrid securities, and sham transactions.15 In the light 
of congressional reluctance to define corporate stocks and securities for tax 
purposes,16 the Kraft decision appears to be a definitive judicial approach 
which acknowledges proper consequences of unambiguous debt issues.17 
Jules M. Perlberg 
valid indebtedness may be created from funds originally part of the debtor's equity 
capital. See, e.g., Lansing Community Hotel Corp., note 10 supra; Toledo Blade Co., 
note 6 supra. 
14 Sun Properties v. United States, (5th Cir. 1955) 220 F. (2d) 171. See Sutherland, 
"Taxpayers' Motive as a Basis for Taxability," N.Y.U. EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON 
FEDERAL TAXATION 990 (1950). 
111 See Kaufman, "Income Tax Consequences of Corporate Debentures," N.Y.U. SEV-
ENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1016 at 1027 (1949). 
16 S. Rep. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 42 (1954). 
17 The court in the Kraft case, expressly rejecting absence of business purpose and 
absence of new capital as determinative factors in unambiguous debt issues, did not pass 
on the merits of the "thin capitalization" rule. This rule, another outgrowth of the busi-
ness purpose rationale, has been used by the courts when a disproportionate ratio of debt 
to equity capital existed. The Kraft decision considered the thin capitalization test by 
showing that it did not apply when real values were used to compute the debt-equity 
ratio. The use of this test, therefore, still remains as a possible factor in disregarding 
otherwise valid indebtedness for tax purposes. The courts are divided as to the applica-
bility of the test. See generally "Thin Capitalization and Tax Avoidance," 55 CoL. L. REv. 
1054 (1955). Compare Rowan v. United States, (5th Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 51, with Isidor 
Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31 (1950). 
